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‘Partial-birth abortion’ (PBA) is a US colloquialism for intact dilation 
and extraction (D and X),[1] coined by conservative pro-life advocates, 
who liken the procedure to infanticide.[2] Their reasoning is founded on 
the erroneous belief that D and X constitutes the partial delivery and 
subsequent murder of a full-term baby.[3 ,4] Conversely, D and X is a variant 
of dilation and evacuation (D and E),[5,6] possibly the safest procedure 
employed during late termination of pregnancy (LTOP), which refers to 
abortions that occur after 20 weeks’ gestation.[7-15] The Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention have stated that on average, 1.3% of abortions 
in the USA are LTOPs, of which D and Xs comprise fewer than 20%.[15] 
D and Xs are carried out between 20 and 24 weeks’ gestation,[16] and 
typically comprise four steps: cervical dilation; breech conversion; breech 
extraction, excluding the fetal head; and cephalocentesis to induce 
vaginal delivery of the intact fetus.[14,17] The defining feature of D and X 
is cephalocentesis, which entails the removal of the intracranial contents 
by way of a suction device, consequently preventing cervical injury by 
reducing the diameter of the fetal skull prior to intact delivery.[9,10] Hence 
D and X may be more advantageous than D and E,[14] which involves 
fetal dismemberment that is known to increase the risk of maternal 
mortality and morbidity.[11,12] 
Nevertheless, D and X is federally proscribed except in life-
threatening circumstances, as per the US Partial-Birth Abortion 
Ban Act of 2003.[18] Failure to comply with the provisions of the Act 
will result in a fine, imprisonment of up to 2 years, or both a fine 
and imprisonment.[18] The legality of the Act was brought before 
the Supreme Court in Gonzales v Carhart[19] and scrutinised for its 
perceived ambiguity; the Act proscribes surgical feticidal abortion 
procedures comprising the substantial removal of the fetus via 
vaginal delivery.[19] D and E encompasses fetal dismemberment 
requiring substantial removal of the fetus through the vagina, 
a practice that is explicitly proscribed by the Act, and therefore 
D and E could be included under the ban, which could subsequently 
impose an undue burden on women by restricting their reproductive 
health choices.[19] The Supreme Court found the state to hold a bona 
fide interest in fetal protection, and held that the Act exclusively 
proscribes D and X; therefore, proscription is not unduly burdensome 
to women.[19] Currently, D and X is proscribed in 32 US states.[13] 
Currently, the US is the only country worldwide to legally proscribe 
and criminalise D and X. [14]
South Africa (SA)’s Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act No. 92 of 
1996 (CTOPA)[20] is universally hailed as one of the most liberal pieces 
of legislation worldwide.[21] CTOPA makes provision for LTOP after 20 
weeks’ gestation once a physician, having consulted with another 
physician or registered midwife, concludes that: the patient’s life is 
at risk; the fetus is suffering from acute malformation; or the fetus 
may be considerably injured upon delivery.[22-25] However, it does not 
regulate feticide and abortion procedures.[14] Consequently, abortion 
procedures may be employed at the discretion of a physician, 
without legal repercussions.[14] This highlights the importance of 
this evaluation of the reasons for the proscription of D and X, prior 
to determining whether it is constitutionally and ethically justifiable 
in SA.[14] The outcome of this evaluation could inform legislation and 
policy on the regulation of feticide in SA.[14]
Fetal pain 
Medical evidence suggests that the structures required to experience 
pain begin to manifest during the first trimester,[14,26] and are 
fully developed towards the end of the second trimester.[14,27] The 
application of painful stimuli triggers a stress response between 
18 and 20 weeks’ gestation, possibly causing neurodevelopmental 
deficiencies,[14,28,29] hence the use of anaesthesia and analgesics 
during fetal surgery.[14,30] Nonetheless, the fetus supposedly requires 
up to 50 times the regular adult dosage of anaesthesia, since the 
placental membrane creates a barrier between woman and fetus.[14,31] 
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When anaesthesia is administered to the woman, it filters through 
her blood stream before infiltrating the placental membrane to 
have an effect on the fetus.[14,31] Consequently, the woman would 
require a dosage detrimental to her health.[14,31] Therefore, the fetus 
cannot receive the dosage it requires to be anaesthetised during the 
D and X without jeopardising the health of the woman.  Moreover, 
the neurotransmitters mediating pain present during the second 
trimester,[14,32] yet neurotransmitters diminishing pain only appear in 
the third trimester; subsequently, fetuses aged between 20 and 30 
weeks are purportedly vulnerable to pain.[14,32] 
Conversely, conflicting medical evidence has shown that fetal pain 
is improbable without the essential biological and neuroanatomical 
structures facilitating pain.[14,19] The feeling of pain is dependent 
on a thalamocortical connection; supporting evidence illustrating 
fetal thalamocortical connection is limited.[14,33] Pain necessitates the 
perception of noxious stimuli, requiring functional thalamocortical 
connections.[14,31] However, thalamocortical fibres only manifest 
during the final trimester;[14,30] therefore, fetal pain is doubtful before 
then.[14] Regardless, proscription of D and X on the grounds of 
fetal pain is untenable.[14] Even if fetal pain were irrefutable, all 
feticidal surgical TOP procedures available between the first and third 
trimester could be subjected to proscription if fetal pain develops 
during the first trimester[33] and is definitive by the second,[14,27] 
consequently imposing an undue burden on women and physicians. 
Accordingly, the argument is indefensible, bearing in mind that 
although a pro-life alternative to abortion, such as adoption, might 
resolve the issue, this is not always feasible.[14]
Informed consent
In the US case of the National Abortion Federation et al. v Ashcroft,[34] 
physicians ostensibly repudiated patient autonomy by failing to 
properly solicit informed consent for D and X. During the informed-
consent process, the physicians allegedly employed hyper-technical 
medical terms that were unintelligible to patients, evaded questions 
or deliberately withheld information pertaining to fetal pain, or 
reassured patients that anaesthesia would ensure painless fetal 
demise.[14,31] 
South Africans enjoy the constitutional rights to bodily integrity,[35] 
including the rights to self-determination, healthcare[36] and access to 
information,[37] which are statutorily protected by the National Health 
Act (NHA) No. 61 of 2003. The NHA legally and ethically obligates 
physicians to solicit informed consent before undertaking any medical 
examinations, treatments or surgeries.[14,38] Patients must be informed 
of every medical or surgical procedure relevant and available to them, 
including the benefits, risks, costs and possible consequences of each 
option.[14,39] Physicians are also required to inform patients of their 
right of refusal, and the possible risks, implications and obligations 
accompanying it.[14,39] During the informed-consent process, patients 
must be informed in a manner appropriate to their literary levels.[14,40] 
Physicians must ensure that patients comprehend the information 
before voluntarily consenting to or refusing treatment, surgery 
or examination. However, physicians may invoke the therapeutic 
privilege enabling them to withhold important medical information 
that would normally be disclosed during the informed-consent 
process until after medical assistance has been rendered to the 
patient, provided disclosure is within the patient’s best interest.[14,38,41] 
In the case described above, it can be argued that the physicians 
repudiated patient autonomy, as the patients did not fully consent 
to the procedure, and therapeutic privilege would not be applicable 
under the circumstances.[14] 
The presumption that a physician would deliberately repudiate 
patient autonomy for D and X is specious.[14] Providing comprehensive 
information concerning feticide to a patient requesting abortion is 
difficult for the physician to do, and it can be hard for the patient 
to hear.[14] Physicians are required to convey the benefits, risks and 
implications of each procedure available to the patient, enabling 
the patient to make an autonomous healthcare decision, thereby 
upholding the patient’s constitutional and statutory rights.[14,39] If the 
patient wishes to be scrupulously informed about each procedure, 
the physician should oblige, provided it is within the patient’s best 
interests; however, the physician is not legally obligated to do so.[14] 
One also has to take into consideration that the informed-consent 
process could be compounded in emergency situations, given the 
time-sensitive nature of the event.[14] Likewise, the process may be 
more difficult for physicians tending to patients in the public sector, 
in light of the time constraints.[14]
Wanton abuse 
The claim that wanton abuse  of the D and X procedure might occur 
stems from the notion that D and X is performed electively on healthy 
fetuses.[14] This argument is predicated on US congressional reports 
on three physicians, Martin Haskell, James McMahon and David 
Grundmann.[14,42-46] According to congressional reports, the physicians 
expressly conveyed their willingness to employ D and X owing to its 
convenience and efficacy, cumulatively performing thousands of the 
procedures that are erroneously referred to in the reports as PBAs.[14,42-46] 
Each physician allegedly confessed to performing the majority of D 
and X procedures electively on healthy fetuses.[14,44-46] If D and X was 
cited for medical reasons, the fetuses suffered from neurological 
impairments and shallow defects that could be surgically improved 
or managed.[14,44] Additionally, D and X was offered to patients on 
the grounds of fetal impairment, socioeconomic hardship and to 
adolescent minors by Grundmann.[14,44]
Wanton abuse as a ground for proscription of D and X is 
spurious.[14] The argument does not exclusively apply to D and X, as 
it can be applied to any surgical abortion procedure.[14] For instance, a 
physician could favour D and E over induction of labour (IOL), since D 
and E is a convenient and shorter outpatient procedure than IOL.[14,47] 
Alternatively, the physician may opt for IOL, a protracted inpatient 
abortion procedure that would probably yield more financial gain for 
the physician, even though D and E might be applicable.[14,48] Similarly, 
the physician might prefer D and E to D and X for similar reasons.[14] 
The evidence regarding wanton abuse is also meagre, considering 
that it is predicated on the alleged abuse by three physicians.[14] It 
is irrational to proscribe D and X on the basis of convenience and 
simplicity when it is efficacious. Furthermore, the provision of abortion 
services to minors and on socioeconomic grounds is reflective of SA 
law. CTOPA strives to uphold women’s constitutional rights, specifically 
the rights to bodily integrity and reproductive healthcare.[14,35,36] 
CTOPA allows abortion for a woman of any age, upon her consent.[49,50] 
Abortion is available between 13 and 20 weeks’ gestation once the 
physician, in consultation with the patient, has concluded that: the 
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pregnancy will be detrimental to her physical or mental health; the 
fetus is at risk of acute physical or mental disability; conception was 
the product of rape or incest; or continued pregnancy will adversely 
affect her socioeconomic status.[14,51-54]
Infanticide and neonaticide
While breech presentation is a core element of D and X, the National 
Abortion Federation claims that D and X may be performed via 
cephalic presentation, requiring physicians to collapse the fetal skull 
externally.[14,55] If D and X were performed by cephalic presentation on 
a living fetus that takes its first breath before its demise, the physician 
would be guilty of neonaticide.[14] D and X is also reportedly performed 
without fetal anaesthesia.[14,56] Accordingly, D and X opponents 
believe that the procedure blurs the lines between the crimes of 
infanticide and neonaticide, and abortion. It could be argued that D 
and X deprives the fetus of life on the cusp of personhood, in a bid 
to protect physicians from prosecution.[14] According to the American 
Medical Association, the ‘partial-birth’ aspect of D and X confers the 
right to autonomy on the fetus, thereby fuelling the claim that D and 
X is essentially neonaticide.[14,57]
Nevertheless, it is important to familiarise ourselves with the 
definitions of neonaticide and infanticide before deciding if either 
crime encompasses D and X. Neonaticide is the unlawful killing of 
a new-born child during the first week of its life, and infanticide 
is the unlawful killing of a child during the first year of its life.[58] 
Abortion is the expulsion of the uterine contents, particularly the 
fetus.[20] Legally, neonaticide and infanticide necessitate the killing 
of a person. According to the common law, in order to attain 
personhood and its accompanying rights, the child must be born 
alive and exist independently of its mother.[58-61] During D and X, 
fetal demise transpires within the womb, if the fetus is alive.[14] Thus, 
D and X does not constitute infanticide or neonaticide; killing the 
fetus is not an essential element of D and X, as the procedure is 
often employed in cases of miscarriage.[17] The majority of surgical 
abortion procedures available during each trimester incorporates fetal 
dismemberment, specifically: manual vacuum aspiration, suction and 
curettage, dilation and curettage and D and E.[14,62-65] The remaining 
procedures – IOL, hysterectomy and hysterotomy – usually employ 
feticidal solutions that generally asphyxiate and incinerate the fetus 
to effect fetal demise.[14,66,67] Evidently, D and X is significantly less 
destructive, and perhaps more humane than most feticidal abortion 
procedures available.[14] Moreover, evidence depicting D and X via 
cephalic presentation concerning living fetuses is scant; it is probable 
that D and X via cephalic presentation occurs in cases of miscarriage, 
considering it would be grossly unethical and unlawful to perform on 
a living fetus.[14] 
Conscientious objection
Approximately 95% of South Africans are religious, often belonging to 
one of five prevalent religions: Christianity, African traditional religion, 
Islam, Hinduism and Judaism.[68] All five religions condemn LTOP 
except in life-threatening circumstances.[14,69-75] The right to freedom 
of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion is constitutionally 
protected in SA.[76] Therefore, a physician may conscientiously object 
to performing an abortion outside of an emergency context, as long 
as another physician is willing and available to do so.[14,76,77] CTOPA 
states that LTOP is permissible after 20 weeks’ gestation once a 
physician who has consulted with another physician or registered 
nurse concludes that the pregnancy is life-threatening, the fetus is 
severely malformed or the fetus is at risk of being severely injured 
during birth.[22-25] Therefore it could be argued that if D and X is not 
performed, in accordance with CTOPA, it may abridge the rights of 
the physician if the patient requests D and X, or repudiate the rights 
of the patient if the physician elects to perform D and X and the 
patient does not consent to or refuses the procedure.[14]
Nevertheless, in SA a person is legally and ethically entitled 
to receive emergency medical care, irrespective of whether 
the person requiring emergency assistance is a patient of the 
physician administering the assistance.[14,77,78] Accordingly, should a 
medical emergency arise necessitating LTOP, physicians are legally 
and ethically obligated to perform the LTOP, irrespective of the 
physician’s right to conscientious objection, since it is unjustifiable 
in an emergency setting to deny a patient medical assistance.[14,78] 
Failure to do so will give rise to legal consequences.[14,78] In any 
other circumstances, a physician may conscientiously object to the 
procedure, only if another physician is readily available and willing 
to perform the procedure.[14,78] Since D and X is an LTOP procedure 
employed from 20 weeks onwards, it is governed by section 2(1)(c) 
of CTOPA mentioned above.[22-25] Consequently, a physician’s right to 
conscientious objection is limited to the exceptional circumstances 
outlined in section 2(1)(c) of CTOPA.[22-25] Failure to provide D and 
X in an emergency will give rise to criminal liability if the patient is 
grievously harmed or dies.[14,78]
Futility and unnecessary risks
Some critics dispute the efficacy of D and X in medical emergen-
cies.[79] An ‘emergency’ is defined as ‘a dramatic, sudden situation 
or event, which is of a passing nature in terms of time’, to the 
exclusion of chronic illnesses.[80] Since emergencies are abrupt and 
unforeseeable, immediate medical assistance is obligatory. D and 
X is usually performed over 2 and 3 days owing to the process of 
gradual cervical dilation, hence the argument regarding its futility in 
medical emergencies.[56,79] Additionally, D and X allegedly entails the 
risk of supplementary medical complications when compared with 
alternative LTOP procedures, particularly: ruptured uterus, abruption, 
amniotic fluid embolus, uterine trauma, iatrogenic laceration, secondary 
haemorrhage and infection.[81,82] Therefore, there are allegedly no 
compelling reasons justifying its use.[14] 
In actuality, D and X offers numerous safety benefits that have been 
certified by physicians and accepted by the US Supreme Court.[14,82,83] D 
and X diminishes the risk of cervical laceration, uterine perforation[14,83] 
and vaginal penetration, reducing harm to patients with compromised 
immune systems and susceptible to uterine damage, including 
patients with chorioamnionitis.[14,83] D and X reduces cervical and 
uterine injuries associated with fetal dismemberment, as well as life-
threatening complications such as fetal tissue retention.[14,82,83] The 
procedure mitigates trauma, haemorrhage, anaesthesia and serious 
harm to patients with blood disorders.[14,83] D and X can be particularly 
salutary when severe mal formation necessitates LTOP, such as in 
cases of hydrocephaly, an abnormality that can only be ascertained 
during the final stages of pregnancy.[14,83] Hydrocephaly abnormally 
expands the diameter of the fetal skull to the point of severe brain 
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damage.[79] Cephalocentesis reduces the diameter of the fetal skull, 
permitting safe vaginal delivery, which would otherwise be life-
threatening.[79] D and X is an advantageous and necessary medical 
procedure, which is probably why the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act 
is inclusive of a health exception.[14-18] The claim that D and X is futile in 
emergencies is implicitly flawed, as every LTOP procedure takes place 
over at least 2 days.[14] D and E usually occurs within 2 days,[84] while 
IOL may last several days, given the complexity of the procedure.[49] 
Based on the logic of this argument, D and E and IOL would both be 
considered futile in an emergency context.[14] The alternative is either 
a hysterotomy or hysterectomy, which carry greater risks of maternal 
mortality than childbirth, and both procedures are contraindicated 
by the World Health Organization.[85] 
Proscription is constitutionally and 
ethically unjustifiable 
Proscription of D and X will infringe several constitutional and ethical 
rights of SA women.[14] Proscription will deny women requiring LTOP 
vital information about and access to a medical procedure that 
could be beneficial and advantageous to their personal reproductive 
needs,[14] thereby infringing their rights to access to information and 
to reproductive healthcare.[14] Consequently, women’s right to bodily 
integrity will be breached, as their right to self-determination will be 
unnecessarily limited, ultimately repudiating patient autonomy.[14] 
Furthermore, proscription will lead to unfair discrimination against 
patients suffering from autoimmune conditions and blood disorders, 
since D and X significantly reduces the health risks associated with 
these conditions.[14,86] Consequently, proscription may jeopardise the 
lives of these patients.[14] Should a women require emergency LTOP 
caused by hydrocephaly, D and X would be necessary to prevent 
grievous harm to and/or the death of the patient.[14,83] Subsequently, 
proscription would infringe the right to emergency healthcare, and 
possibly the right to life if proscription is effected without a health 
exception.[14] 
Proscription may force physicians into employing alternative  LTOP 
pro cedures, consequently exacerbating the risk of failed LTOP.[14] Should 
LTOP fail, the physician will be faced with performing either a 
hysterectomy or a hysterotomy, both of which are normally 
contraindicated as the risk of maternal mortality is greater than in 
childbirth.[14,85] Subjecting the patient to multiple procedures that 
could otherwise be easily avoidable abridges the right to dignity 
of, and creates an undue burden on, the patient.[14] Likewise, should 
the physician perform D and X to prevent unnecessary harm to 
the patient, he or she could face criminal liability and ultimately 
incarceration, even though the physician acted in the patient’s best 
interest.[14] Thus, proscription could arbitrarily infringe physicians’ 
right to security of person.[14]
It is apparent that proscription of D and X would be an injudicious 
and unjustifiably restrictive policy that could undermine the 
Constitution and CTOPA, and subsequently increase maternal 
mortality and morbidity in SA.[14] The proscription of D and X would not 
hinder the provision of abortion, as there are several surgical abortion 
procedures comprising feticide.[14] Yet it could unnecessarily endanger 
the lives and health of those who may require D and X. Therefore 
proscription is unethical and unconstitutional.[14] Proscription of D 
and X, a medically necessary, life-saving procedure, would bring 
about more harm than benefit to SA women.[14] Furthermore, if D 
and X were to be proscribed, it would probably be accompanied 
by a health exception permitting the procedure in emergency 
circumstances. This would render the proscription redundant, as 
D and X is an LTOP procedure that is performed after 20 weeks’ 
gestation, and as previously mentioned, CTOPA specifies that LTOP 
is already restricted to the medical emergencies outlined in section 
2(1)(c) above.[14,22-25] 
Moreover, D and X, because it allows the appropriate religious burial 
ceremonies to be conducted for an intact fetus, in comparison with 
more destructive abortion procedures, upholds the right to freedom 
of religion. According to SA law, if a child is stillborn after 26 weeks, 
registration is required for the child’s death.[14,87] Once the death is 
registered, a burial order will be issued to its parents, who are entitled 
to hold a burial ceremony for their child.[14,88] Monotheistic religions 
and African traditional religious ceremonial burial practices require 
believers to cleanse and carefully clothe the deceased in sheaths 
preceding burial, while Hinduism calls for water burials or land burials 
for young children.[14,89-94] D and X is arguably the least destructive 
LTOP procedure, which delivers the fetus intact, rendering it the 
most appropriate procedure for religious burials.[14] Although IOL, 
hysterectomies and hysterotomies may be used, feticidal solutions 
and agents utilised during the procedure tend to visibly destroy 
the fetus,[14,95,96] which could exacerbate the trauma of losing a 
loved one.[14] Hence, D and X may comply with the right to religious 
freedom, by allowing religious ethics to be complied with in a less 
traumatic manner.[14]
One cannot stress the significance of safeguarding and endorsing 
women’s constitutional and reproductive rights enough, specifically 
against the background of the oppressive environment of our nation’s 
divided past. The law at the time stripped women of their reproductive 
rights and exacerbated maternal morbidity and mortality for decades, 
before the introduction of our Constitution and CTOPA.[14] The latter 
went to great lengths to undo the injustices of the past, enabling 
women to reclaim their constitutional and reproductive rights and, 
with the help of the judiciary, safeguard those rights and promote 
women’s reproductive interests.[14] Proscription of D and X or any 
feticidal abortion procedure could jeopardise the legacy that we have 
fought arduously as a nation to achieve.
Recommendations 
While D and X is therefore constitutionally and ethically justifiable, 
there are alternative measures capable of inducing painless fetal 
demise that could be used in conjunction with LTOP procedures to 
effect abortion.[14] It is submitted that physicians should incorporate 
the feticidal agent intracardiac potassium chloride, to achieve 
fetal demise prior to performing LTOP.[14] Administration of the 
agent into the left ventricle of the heart will culminate in asystole, 
ensuring painless fetal demise.[14,97] Thereafter the physician should 
perform the LTOP procedure that has been consented to by the 
patient.[14] Alternatively, where LTOP does not necessitate D and 
X to avert irreparable harm, or death to the patient, or because 
of fetal malformation, and the patient wishes to deliver the fetus, 
provided it is safe to do so, physicians should utilise neonatal 
palliative care (NPC).[14] NPC strives to prevent and alleviate the 
pain and suffering of neonates.[14,98] It is usually reserved in cases 
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involving extremely premature neonates of 23 weeks and younger 
who are in need of intensive care, neonates with lethal conditions, 
including anencephaly, or neonates experiencing unbearable pain, 
and treatment is futile.[14,99]
Conclusion
In conclusion, proscribing D and X, or any abortion procedure for 
that matter, is otiose.[14] Proscription of specific abortion procedures 
appears to be an attempt to circumscribe abortion; however, there 
will always be other opportunities for physicians to effectuate 
feticide, provided abortion is legal.[14] Furthermore, there is no point 
in proscribing D and X with the inclusion of a health exception, 
since LTOP in general is already reserved for rare circumstances that 
qualify as medical emergencies, as per CTOPA.[22-25] Accordingly, 
proscription is redundant and impracticable. The arguments 
buttressing proscription are applicable to all surgical abortion 
procedures available to physicians in every trimester.[14] Therefore, 
these arguments cannot be applied exclusively to any surgical 
abortion procedure, as all are feticidal by definition.[14] Consequently, 
all surgical abortion procedures would be susceptible to proscription, 
which is untenable, unethical and unconstitutional.[14]
In actuality, ‘PBA’ is not a medical procedure; it is a term coined by 
anti-abortion advocates to refer to D and X,[2] a medically necessary, 
life-saving abortion procedure that enables women to exercise their 
constitutional, legal and ethical rights, and it could potentially reduce 
the rates of maternal morbidity and mortality in SA.[14] It should 
be readily considered and used by physicians in the appropriate 
circumstances, as it is not a procedure generally known to be 
practised in SA.[14] D and X should be practised without any possibility 
of legal repercussions in SA. Any attempt to regulate feticide via the 
circumscription of a particular surgical abortion procedure could 
thwart access to safe and legal abortion in SA.[14] 
However, there are ways in which to humanely induce fetal 
demise before LTOP. It is recommended that physicians utilise the 
feticidal agent intracardiac potassium chloride to achieve painless 
fetal demise[97] in conjunction with the LTOP procedure consented 
to by the patient, including D and X. Alternatively, physicians should 
employ NPC when LTOP is not required, or when the patient refuses 
LTOP and her health permits her to deliver the fetus. NPC is specifically 
recommended in cases where the neonate is extremely premature, 
suffers from a lethal condition or is subjected to unbearable pain, and 
treatment is futile.[98,99] 
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